This month’s Guanxi Dialogue ask a foundational question: how does China understand international relations on its own terms, and what does that mean for Europe?
We are honoured to feature Raoul Bunskoek 谷巖杉 , Head of the Clingendael China Centre and Senior Research Fellow at the The Clingendael Institute , one of the Netherlands’ leading foreign policy think tanks. With a background spanning Leiden, National Taiwan University, and post-doctoral research in Africa, Bunskoek brings a rare combination of theoretical depth and policy relevance to his work. In this conversation, he walks us through the Confucian roots of Chinese IR theory, what they reveal about Beijing’s behaviour in the Global South, and the hard choices facing European governments as they pursue strategic autonomy without cutting themselves off from a country with which they are struggling to stay on good terms.
Francesco Palma, Head of the Newsletter
Our conversation commences with Bunskoek’s academic career. He started off with a bachelor’s in China Studies at Leiden University. However, for his master’s degree, he decided to move to Taiwan. At National Taiwan University, he got acquainted with the study of political science and International Relations (IR). Completing a full degree in Mandarin was a challenge, but a stimulating one at that. Nevertheless, this MA programme could only scratch the surface of his interests, especially when it came to the topic of China and IR. His fascination with the work of Taiwan-based scholar Chih-yu Shih, who has advocated a ‘sinicising’ of IR theorisations, is what motivated him to pursue a PhD in the field. We asked him what exactly sets Chinese IR theory apart from what we usually encounter in Western universities. Bunskoek replied that from his vantage point in Taipei, he was able to explore Chinese alternatives to the Western-centric nature of IR theories: since the 1980s, there has been a remarkable development of IR theory from a Chinese perspective. According to Bunskoek, Chinese practices in IR, or IR theory ‘with Chinese characteristics’, if you will, have gradually evolved from a Marxist-Leninist approach to becoming increasingly informed by Confucian principles.
Confucian thinking attaches prime importance to relationality, and particularly ‘reciprocity’ within relationships, even the hierarchical ones. Concretely, this means that from a Confucian point of view, a relationship should always go both ways: every side of a relationship has an obligation to the other side. According to such a theory, if Chinese leaders want to be seen as moral and virtuous by the world, they must show generosity and benevolence abroad to foster goodwill. In exchange, recipient countries are expected to show (or feign) gratefulness and acknowledge China’s status as a moral guide. Bunskoek says: “Chinese official sources usually refer to this as ‘mutually beneficial’ or ‘win-win’ relationships”. He adds: “If China’s central leadership is serious about following Confucian thinking, it needs to lead by virtue. And leading by virtue according to Confucianism means one showcases selfless behaviour. One way of doing this is to provide gifts to others. The expectation thereafter is that countries will reciprocate by recognising Chinese leaders for their moral leadership.”
This leads us from the theory to empirical reality. If we want to understand Chinese actors’ behaviour on the international stage, it is important to grasp the psychology behind their actions. Bunskoek mentions how his research on Chinese worldviews has helped him to apply this knowledge on cases in the real world. The idea of reciprocity can also describe China’s relationship with the Global South, for example. His post-doctoral research in the ERC Africa’s Infrastructure Globalities (INFRAGLOB) project at the University of Bayreuth centred on Chinese development thinking in Africa. Bunskoek reminds us that China is a large provider of development aid and infrastructure investments. Additionally, thanks to its policy of non-intervention, Chinese actors are in a position where they can establish and maintain good relations with a wide range of actors, regardless of who is in power. In sticking to this policy of non-intervention, China resolutely walks a different path compared with the other global power, the United States. Applying the Confucian-inspired theory of IR in this case, the US has gradually been losing its legitimacy as a virtuous leader because of its repeated interventionist policies in the recent past.
However, we should not overstate China’s influence in the Global South. Although China can provide substantial financial and material means, its “biggest challenge is that countries have too high expectations of what China can do.” Governments must devise their own development plans for them to be successful. From a Confucian point of view, it’s the local functionaries who should know what is best for their locality and their people. Again, this ties in neatly with the principle of non-intervention.
We turned the conversation from China back to the EU and its current challenges in the field of international relations. One big topic many have been talking about lately is ‘diversification’, or more importantly, how to achieve it. Bunskoek: “There is a trend in which countries in the Global South buy equipment, military or otherwise, from a broad array of different countries; whereas we used to say that this is unwise, because equipment from different countries might be incompatible. In the current environment, however, it might even be a wise choice, because nobody wants to be dependent on a single country”. On this point and when it comes to managing various kinds of relationships, he believes that the EU might actually be able to learn something from Global South countries. In many ways, the situation the EU finds itself now in, between Russia, China, and the US, is a situation many Global South countries have many decades of experience with.
Diversification is one step, but if the grand objective for the EU is more ambitious, let’s say reaching ‘strategic autonomy’, diversification does not suffice. “(…) if you want to work on improving your own strategic autonomy, you need to become competitive yourself.“ Bunskoek is clear on this point: Europe is no longer (and hasn’t been for a while) a main player when it comes to technological innovation. If the EU wants to achieve strategic autonomy, it will also have to come up with a plan to develop future technologies. That happens to be a field where China is a leading innovator. Bunskoek warns us of the dangers of decoupling completely from Chinese academia and the Chinese market in general, which would put the EU at risk of falling even further behind. For European researchers and companies alike, engagement with Chinese counterparts is a way to secure access to these technologies. But the balancing act between continued engagement and safeguarding technological advantages has proven to be extremely difficult. Last year’s Nexperia case, when the Dutch government seized control of the chip-manufacturer, demonstrates this point.
Maybe, if the Nexperia saga has taught Europeans anything, it is the fact that dealing with Chinese counterparts in both the private and public sectors requires a lot of specialised knowledge on specific topics, as well as diplomatic skills. Entering a meeting room where your partner knows everything about you, but you don’t know much about them, can be considered a strategic failure. Bunskoek encourages us to stay up to date on the constant transformations of the Chinese policy, academic, technological, and corporate worlds, because nothing remains the same for long. It is of paramount importance to try to understand the Chinese position on IR theory, diplomacy, development thinking and so on from Chinese points of view. This can, however, be quite challenging and requires sustained investment from governments and the private sector alike.